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Lawrence Ezrow University of Essex and Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam
Cross-national analyses are presented that suggest that changes in the variance of voters’ policy preferences—in 12
Western European democracies from 1976 to 1998—are associated with corresponding changes in the variance of
policy choices on offer in these party systems. This finding is labeled the Voter Distribution Effects Result. There is
also evidence to support a second major finding, the Electoral Laws Result, which states that voter distribution effects,
i.e., the effects associated with changes in the variance of voters’ policy preferences, are stronger in political systems
that feature less proportional electoral rules (e.g., plurality voting systems). These findings have implications for party
strategies and for our general understanding of political representation.
While previous theoretical and empiricalresearch emphasizes the primacy of themean or median voter’s policy preference
as the starting point for democratic representation
(Adams et al. 2004, 2006; Downs 1957; Erikson,
MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Huber and Powell 1994;
McDonald and Budge 2005; Powell 2000; Stimson,
MacKuen, and Erikson 1995), this paper expands this
notion by considering the variance of voters’ policy
preferences as an additional aspect of public opinion. If
parties converge to the median voter position in a
Downsian fashion then “popular” representation may
be said to occur. However, to exclusively study whether
democracies represent the will of the median voter
overlooks whether parties effectively represent the
diversity (i.e., the variance) of policy preferences in the
electorate.
Previous empirical studies on representation in
advanced industrial societies have presented strong
evidence that shifts in parties’ policy positions tend to
mirror shifts in the mean or median voter position
(see Adams et al. 2004, 2006; Erikson, MacKuen, and
Stimson 2002; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995).
Added to this criterion for evaluating democratic
responsiveness is the concept of dynamic distributional
representation. Dynamic distributional representation
occurs when the diversity of policy alternatives on
offer in a party system increases or decreases in
response to changes in the diversity of voters’ policy
preferences. With respect to dynamic distributional
representation, the following questions are addressed:
First, are changes in the diversity of voter preferences
accompanied by roughly corresponding shifts in the
degree of diversity of policy choices on offer in a given
party system? Second, is this linkage between policy
diversity in the electorate and in the party system
mediated by the electoral system?
The empirical analyses reported below support
the following conclusions. First, the party systems that
are analyzed do in fact display dynamic distributional
representation. That is, the degree of policy diversity
in these party systems systematically changes in
response to changes in the diversity of mass publics’
policy preferences. Furthermore, dynamic distribu-
tional representation is stronger in countries that
feature less proportional voting systems, in particular
plurality-based systems. The scope of the study
includes 12 Western European democracies from 1976
to 1998.
There are at least three reasons why distributional
representation is important. First, a central function of
parliament is to reflect the diversity of public opinion
(see, e.g., Pitkin 1967), and this is not possible unless
the party system reflects public opinion diversity; for
instance if there are no extreme parties in the system
then extremist voters cannot elect representatives who
will articulate their opinions. If the mean (or median)
voter position is the only position that is represented
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in parliament, then a disconnect arises between the
parties in a political system and those citizens that do
not have centrist ideological views. Viewed through a
representative lens, a party system with no choices
available can hardly be viewed as democratic, and the
diversity of policy choices offered by parties is one
measure of how democratic a political system is.
Connecting to the above idea, Cox notes that the
representative process can be defined “in terms of
whether each voter can find a legislator who advocates
similar views” (1997, 236; italics added). If this is
indeed the case then—to the extent that citizens derive
satisfaction when their policy views are articulated by
political parties, and that these parties respond to
shifts in voters’ viewpoints—distributional represen-
tation should enhance popular satisfaction with the
democratic process. Consequently, while it is impos-
sible to implement policies that reflect every citizen’s
viewpoint, members of the mass public nevertheless
derive satisfaction when an official (elected or not)
publicly argues for their points of view, even if these
viewpoints are outvoted in the legislature. One mani-
festation of this increased satisfaction is that ideologi-
cally diverse party systems may motivate higher voter
turnout—an outcome that Powell (1982) has argued is
normatively desirable.1
Second, the concept of dynamic distributional
representation is significant because it is relevant to
the literature on party positioning strategies. There is
abundant theoretical research that seeks to explain
centripetal and centrifugal incentives for party behav-
ior, including studies by Cox (1990) and by Merrill
and Adams (2002)—discussed below—that relate
parties’ policy strategies to the diversity of voters’
policy beliefs.2 However, to date no empirical study
has explored whether parties systematically adjust
their policies in response to changes in the diversity of
public opinion. That is what is done here.
Third, in an important series of papers Andrews
and Money (2005a, 2005b) argue that a crucial (and
understudied) aspect of the political parties literature
revolves around the properties of party systems as a
whole, i.e., features that relate to party systems as
organic entities rather than to their component parts
(i.e., individual parties). The present study addresses
the ideological diversity of the alternatives on offer
within party systems, a focus which fits squarely
within the Andrews-Money framework and suggests
that the analysis of party systems as collectives illumi-
nates important aspects of political representation.
In the following section, the Voter Diversity and
the Electoral Laws hypotheses are formulated. The
third section discusses the data and calculations used
to test the hypotheses. The fourth section presents
model specifications and analyzes the results, and the
final section offers a brief explanation of the findings
and concludes.
Hypotheses
The first hypothesis concerns the central linkage that is
relevant to distributional representation, namely the
connection between the diversity of the electorate’s
policy preferences and the diversity of the policy pro-
grams on offer in a party system:
H1 (the Voter Diversity Hypothesis): Changes in the
diversity of voters’ policy preferences cause corre-
sponding changes in the diversity of policy posi-
tions presented by the competing parties in a
political system.
The first hypothesis is motivated by the theoretical
work of Cox (1990) and Merrill and Adams (2002),
which presents results suggesting that parties’
centripetal/centrifugal incentives are influenced by the
diversity of the electorate’s policy preferences. The
logic of these studies is quite clear: if voters spread
towards the extremes of the ideological continuum,
then vote-seeking parties have more to gain by articu-
lating noncentrist viewpoints. Alternatively, as the
degree of ideological diversity in the electorate
declines, the expectation is that parties, responding to
voters, will converge towards the center of the ideo-
logical space.
Figure 1 depicts the expectation that is raised by
the Voter Diversity Hypothesis. The figure displays
four parties, a, b, c, and d, that are arrayed along a
left-right dimension; the figure also displays two voter
distributions: A and B. If the voter distribution
expands and, for example, shifts from Voter Distribu-
tion A to Voter Distribution B, then the Voter Diversity
Hypothesis (H1) states that the parties will diversify
their positions along the left-right continuum. Notice
that even if the parties do not diversify their positions,
the median voter is nevertheless represented under
1The normative value of distributional representation is also clear
in the writings of Sartori who argues that “Parties are channels of
expression. That is to say, parties belong, first and foremost, to the
means of representation: They are an instrument, or an agency, for
representing the people by expressing their demands” (1976, 27;
italics original).
2Following Cox (1990), centripetal incentives are those that reward
parties that converge towards the center of the voter distribution,
while centrifugal incentives are the factors that cause parties to
take distinctly noncentrist positions.
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either scenario (i.e., under Voter Distribution A or
Voter Distribution B). This illustrates the point that
normative conceptions of representation that empha-
size the primacy of the median voter’s policy position
are distinct from the normative criterion that is
explored here, which revolves around representation
of the diversity of the mass public’s policy preferences.
H2 (The Electoral Laws Hypothesis): The diversity
of party ideologies on offer in party systems with
proportional electoral laws is less responsive to
changes in the degree of voter diversity than is the
distributional responsiveness of party systems in
countries with disproportional electoral laws.
While the Voter Diversity Hypothesis (H1)
emphasizes the ideological connection between
parties and their supporters, the Electoral Laws
Hypothesis (H2) posits that this effect is mediated by
the voting system, and, perhaps counterintuitively,
that this connection is stronger in less proportional
electoral systems.3 The first argument that underlies
H2 is that less proportional voting systems—notably
plurality systems—plausibly motivate political parties
to emphasize vote-seeking objectives, so that the
parties competing in these systems can be expected to
be more responsive to changes in the distribution of
voters’ policy preferences. The reason that dispropor-
tional systems plausibly promote vote-seeking behav-
ior by parties is because of the well-known fact that
such voting systems tend to “punish” smaller parties
and reward larger parties when national vote returns
are converted into parliamentary seats (see Cox 1997;
Taagepera and Shugart 1989); for this reason, dispro-
portional systems may motivate parties to place a
premium on gaining substantial vote shares, so that
they can be among the large parties that benefit from
this effect. By contrast the lower effective seat thresh-
olds associated with highly proportional (PR) voting
systems plausibly motivate the parties in these systems
to emphasize policy objectives and to thereby be more
ideologically “rigid” in the face of voter shifts, because
these parties are assured of at least some parliamen-
tary representation when they are confident that their
vote shares will exceed the relatively low national
thresholds that are necessary to obtain legislative seats
in highly proportional systems.4
A related argument, one that is emphasized by
Dow (2001), is that in disproportional, plurality-based
systems the major parties may reasonably aspire to
win a single-party parliamentary majority, which gives
these major parties added incentives to maximize
votes. For instance, the plurality-based postwar elec-
tions held in Britain and New Zealand (the latter
country featured plurality until its switch to PR
in 1996) returned single-party parliamentary majori-
ties in over 80% of the cases.5 Dow (2001) argues that
this “winner-take-all” feature of disproportional,
plurality-based elections motivates political parties to
be highly responsive to voters’ policy preferences.
While it is naïve to suggest that parties in PR
systems do not seek votes, it is equally naïve to over-
look that competing priorities exist for parties operat-
ing under PR electoral rules. For example, the work of
Norman Schofield and his co-authors (Schofield et al.
1998) as well as Laver and Shepsle’s Making and Break-
ing Governments (1996) suggests that in order to be
part of the government, parties need to be attractive
coalition partners, i.e., parties are motivated to
3Notice that the Electoral Laws Hypothesis could be framed as a
nondirectional hypothesis. Namely, it is also reasonable to expect
that proportional systems would display higher levels of distribu-
tional responsiveness than plurality voting systems. The intuition
behind this expectation is fairly clear: smaller parties (associated
with PR systems) should have more information about their sup-
porters, and, furthermore, these parties are more flexible in terms
of responding to shifts in their supporters’ positions. In contrast,
the large parties associated with electoral competition in dispro-
portional systems should have more difficulty collecting informa-
tion about their supporters, and their correspondingly larger
organizational structures should make it more difficult to respond
to their supporters’ ideological shifts.
4There is evidence that in multiparty systems (i.e., systems associ-
ated with PR electoral rules), parties increase their vote shares as
their policy distance to the mean voter position decreases (see
Ezrow 2005). Yet the extent to which parties actually respond to
these centripetal incentives is unclear, which also suggests that
increasing vote shares is not the sole motive explaining party
behavior in PR systems.
5Fifteen out of seventeen postwar British elections have returned
single-party parliamentary majorities, while in New Zealand each
of the postwar elections held under plurality through the mid-
1990s returned parliamentary majorities.
FIGURE 1 Demonstrating the Voter Diversity
Hypothesis
Note: a, b, c, and d represent hypothetical parties.
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respond to the policy preferences of other parties in
the system, rather than responding exclusively to
voters’ policy preferences. Shifting away from the
center of the party system, in response to increasing
ideological diversity in the electorate, is likely to make
parties less attractive coalition partners, even if this
outward shift garners additional popular support.
Thus parties in PR systems have incentives to consis-
tently appeal to potential post-election coalition part-
ners, regardless of whether or not voters’ policy
positions have changed.
Furthermore, to the extent that parties are policy
seeking rather than office seeking, recent theoretical
work suggests that parties in plurality-based systems
will be more responsive to the changes in the diversity
voters’ ideologies than will parties in PR systems.
Smirnov and Fowler (2004) argue that parties’ optimal
positions in two-party, plurality-based elections
diverge as the electorate becomes more polarized.
However on the PR-side, an Adams and Merrill (2005)
study on policy-seeking strategies in multiparty-PR
electoral contexts concludes that parties are motivated
to adjust their policy strategies in response to their
beliefs about the median voter’s position, rather than
in response to the diversity of voter ideologies in the
electorate. In sum, there are persuasive theoretical
reasons to expect that parties—whether they are office
or policy seeking—will be most responsive to changes
in the electorate’s ideological diversity when elections
are conducted using less proportional voting systems.
Data and Measurement
Measuring Parties’ Policy Positions, Voter
Dispersion, and Proportionality
The Voter Diversity Hypothesis posits that changes in
the dispersion of voters’ ideological preferences are
accompanied by similar shifts in the dispersion of
parties’ policy positions. Thus, to test this proposition
it is necessary to develop longitudinal, cross-national
measures of parties’ policy programs as well as of
voters’ policy preferences.
For longitudinal measurements of party policy
positions, the estimates from the Comparative Mani-
festo Project (CMP) are used. The CMP has coded the
policy programs of the significant parties competing
in the elections of approximately 25 democracies
throughout the post-War period. This data source is
particularly useful as it provides longitudinal and
cross-national estimates of parties’ policies for the
countries and time periods under examination. More-
over, these estimates of party positions should be reli-
able and accurate statements about parties’ positions
at the time of elections, as evidenced by intense intra-
party debates over the content of parties’ programs.
While the methods that are employed to map
parties’ policy positions based on their election pro-
grams are briefly reviewed here, they are described in
far more detail in several publications linked to the
CMP.6 The coders isolate “quasi-sentences” in the
party’s policy program and pair them with a policy
category (e.g., education, defense, law and order,
morality, etc.). The percentages of each category
provide the basis for estimating the policy priorities of
a party.
The CMP ideological scores for parties’ policy
programs range from -100 (extreme left) to +100
(extreme right). The analytical payoff of the CMP data
is that it allows one to “map” party positions over time.
Furthermore, these measures are generally consistent
with those from other party positioning studies, such
as those based upon expert placements, citizen percep-
tions of parties’ positions, and parliamentary voting
analyses, which provides additional confidence in the
longitudinal and cross-national reliability of these
estimates (see Hearl 2001; Laver, Benoit, and Garry
2003; McDonald and Mendes 2001). For the analyses
the parties’ left-right positions have been rescaled
from the -100 to +100 scale used by the CMP to the
1–10 scale that is customarily used in survey research;
this allows for meaningful comparisons to be made
with the voter dispersion data described below.
The longitudinal measure of voter dispersion
derives from Eurobarometer surveys dating from 1976
(the first year that the left-right self-placement item
appears on the Eurobarometer survey) until 1998 (the
most recent year for which the CMP data is available).
The surveys ask approximately 1,000 respondents in
each country to place themselves on a 1-10 left-right
ideological scale.7 The standard deviation of respon-
dents’ self-placements constitutes the measure of voter
dispersion. The dispersions of Eurobarometer respon-
dents’ left-right self-placements, stratified by year, for
the 12 countries included in the analysis—Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portu-
gal, and Spain—are reported in an appendix (Table
A1) at the JOP website (http://journalofpolitics.org/
6For a more thorough description of the coding process, see
Appendix 2 in Budge et al. (2001).
7Specifically, the Eurobarometer surveys ask, “In political matters,
people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right.’ How would you place your
views on this scale?”
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articles.html). The interelection periods that are
included in the empirical analyses are presented in this
web appendix as well.
Finally, to measure voting system proportionality,
the electoral system disproportionality index devel-
oped by Gallagher (1991) is relied upon, which mea-
sures the squared differences between parties’ vote
shares and their seat shares in parliament. The equa-
tion for the Gallagher Index of Disproportionality is
1
2
2Σ v si i−( ) , where vi and si are the vote shares and
seat shares for party i. According to this measure,
larger discrepancies between votes and seats indicate
greater electoral system disproportionality. These
measures indicate that countries such as Denmark,
Germany, and Belgium feature quite proportional
electoral systems, while Britain and France—the two
countries in the study that employ some form of
plurality—are comparatively disproportional.8
Measuring the Dependent Variable:
Interelection Shifts in Party System
Dispersion
Although measuring parties’ policy programs is rela-
tively straightforward insofar as the information has
already been collected by the Comparative Manifesto
Project, aggregating parties’ policy positions into a
valid country-level measure of party system dispersion
is more complicated. Specifically, in constructing such
a measure, scholars disagree about whether or not the
parties’ positions should be weighted by their size (see
Alvarez and Nagler 2004; Dow 2001; Kollman, Miller,
and Page 1998). The argument for weighting party
system dispersion by party size is that such weighting
accounts for the fact that the small parties in some
countries—such as the American Green Party, the
British Socialist Party, and so on—have virtually no
political influence, so that their policy proposals do
not enlarge the menu of policy choices available to
voters in any meaningful sense. The arguments for
relying on an unweighted measure of party system
dispersion are, first, that any weighting system is
unavoidably arbitrary given that a parties’ policy
influence does not necessarily correlate with vote (or
seat) share, and, second, that small parties provide a
vehicle through which voters can express their policy
preferences, regardless of whether or not such parties
significantly influence government policy outputs.
Both of these arguments appear reasonable, and, con-
sequently, empirical analyses are reported for both
weighted and unweighted measures of party system
dispersion.
The unweighted party system dispersion measure
is defined as the standard deviation of all of the
parties’ policy positions that are reported by the Com-
parative Manifesto Project for a given election. The
weighted party system dispersion measure is based on
the Party System Compactness measure that has been
developed in a Political Analysis paper by Alvarez and
Nagler (2004), where the measure of party dispersion
weights—by vote shares—parties’ policy distances
from the party system center. The equation for
weighted party system dispersion is:
Weighted Party System Dispersion
j jk kj
= −( )
=
∑ VS P P 21 (1)
where
Pk = the weighted mean of all the parties’ left-right
ideological positions in country k.
Pjk = the ideological position of party j in country
k.
VSj = Vote share for party j.
To visualize the mechanics of the unweighted
(UPSD) and weighted (WPSD) measures of party
system dispersion, refer to Figure 2a and 2b which
depict the 1983 elections in Great Britain. The WPSD
measure is calculated as 1.31, while UPSD is calculated
as 1.09.9 The explanation for the difference is
straightforward—the Conservative and Labour
Parties are coded as relatively noncentrist parties in
the British system, and they received the largest shares
of the vote in the 1983 national elections. Thus the
8The electoral system disproportionality scores for each country
are also reported in the web appendix. In addition, note that the
countries’ relative rankings with respect to Gallagher’s measure of
disproportionality are consistent with alternative measures devel-
oped to assess voting system disproportionality, such as Taagepera
and Shugart’s measure of “Effective District Magnitude” (see Table
12.1 in Taagepera and Shugart 1989). The substantive conclusions
reported below do not change when disproportionality is mea-
sured using effective district magnitude in place of the Gallagher
Index.
9Specifically, the unweighted party system dispersion (UPSD)
measure is calculated as
3 74 5 17 5 07 5 17 5 07 5 17 6 81 5 17
4
1 09
2 2. . . . . . . .
.
− + − + − + −
=
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 ,
where 5.17 represents the mean party position, and 3.74, 5.07,
5.07, and 6.81 represent the positions of Labour, the Social Demo-
crats, the Liberals, and the Conservative Party, respectively. The
weighted party system dispersion (WPSD) measure is calculated as
.289 3.74 5.17 5.07 5.17
5.07 5.17
2
2
× −( ) + × −( ) +
× −( ) +
.
. .
122
144 445 × −( ) =6.81 5.17 2 1 31.
2
, where the
parties’ deviations from the weighted party mean (5.46) are
weighted by their shares of the vote.
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diversity of the parties’ positions in 1983 Britain is
greater when the parties’ positions are weighted by
their vote shares than when all party positions are
weighted equally.
Testing the Voter Diversity and
Electoral Laws Hypotheses
Model Specification for the Hypotheses
A multivariate regression model is specified in order to
test the Voter Diversity Hypothesis (H1) and the Elec-
toral Laws Hypothesis (H2). The dependent variable
in the analyses is the interelection change in party
system dispersion, and the crucial independent vari-
able is the interelection change in voter dispersion,
defined as the change in the standard deviation of
voters’ ideological self-placements between the year of
the current election and the year of the previous elec-
tion. In addition, the Electoral Laws Hypothesis (H2)
states that the linkages between voters’ ideological
diversity and party system dispersion are mediated by
the proportionality of the electoral system. The basic
model specification is:
Change in party system dispersion t
Change in voter dispers
( )
= +B B1 2 ion t
Change in voter dispersion t Electoral
system dis
( )[ ]+
( )[B *3
proportionality
Electoral system disproportionality
]+
[ ]B4
(2)
where
Change in party system dispersion (t) = the change in
the dispersion of parties’ left-right policy positions
in the current election, compared with the disper-
sion of party positions in the previous election
(election t-1), based on the CMP data.
Change in voter dispersion (t) = the change in the dis-
persion of citizen policy preferences in the current
election, compared with the dispersion of citizen
policy preferences in the previous election (election
t-1), based on the Eurobarometer data.
Electoral system disproportionality = the measure of
disproportionality as estimated by Gallagher’s
Index of Disproportionality, reported in Appendix
A in Lijphart (1999).
The dependent variable, change in party system disper-
sion, is constructed so that positive scores indicate that
the dispersion of parties’ policy positions has increased
between elections, and negative scores denote a con-
vergence of parties’ policies. The independent variable,
change in voter dispersion, is constructed so that posi-
tive scores indicate that voters’ policy preferences have
become more dispersed between elections, and nega-
tive scores denote the opposite. Thus, if there is evi-
dence for the Voter Diversity Hypothesis (H1), the
parameter estimating the effects of change in voter
FIGURES 2a and 2b Demonstrating the Weighted
and Unweighted Measures of
Party System Dispersion:
The 1983 British National
Elections
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Notes: The parties’ left-right positions represent the CMP’s
codings of the parties’ policy programmes. The CMP codings,
which range from -100 to +100, have been recalibrated to a 1-10
scale. Although the Liberals and Social Democratic Party have
been coded as separate parties, the estimates of their Left-Right
scores are identical (5.07) for the 1983 Elections. Also note that this
clarifies Figure 2a, which portrays the Liberals as gaining
approximately 2 percentage points more than the Social
Democratic Party.
the variance matters: how party systems represent the preferences of voters 187
dispersion (the parameter B2 in equation 2) will be
positive and statistically significant.
To test the Electoral Laws Hypothesis, the interac-
tion term, change in voter dispersion*electoral system
disproportionality, is included in the specification. If
the parameter estimate B3 associated with this variable
is positive and statistically significant, this will support
the Electoral Laws Hypothesis (H2), that party system
dispersion is more responsive to voter system disper-
sion in countries with disproportional electoral laws.
The electoral system disproportionality variable is
included in the specification on its own so that the
effects of the interaction term are measured accurately
(see Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Braumoeller
2004).10 The specification given by equation 2 is
labeled the basic specification.11
Results for the Basic Specification
The analysis encompassed 62 interelection policy dis-
persion shifts by voters and parties in Britain, Italy,
Denmark, Belgium, France, Greece, Spain, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, and
Germany in the period 1976–98. The data are best
characterized as time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) as
the set of observations include an average of 5.2 inter-
election measurements per country, across 12 Western
European democracies. Estimating a simple regression
on the pooled data can lead to erroneous conclusions
if there are unobserved differences between countries
(Green, Kim, and Yoon 2001; Hsiao 2003). A likeli-
hood ratio test for random effects (X1
2 00= . , p = 1.00)
failed to reject the null hypothesis of no country-
specific effects.12 Thus unobserved differences between
countries are not driving the major findings.
The parameter estimates for the basic specifica-
tion are presented in columns 1–2 of Table 1. In the
table, the coefficients estimating the effect of the
change in voter dispersion variable upon the change in
party system dispersion variable are positive and reach
statistical significance, regardless of whether the cal-
culations are based on the Unweighted Party System
Dispersion variable (column 1) or the Weighted Party
System Dispersion variable (column 2). Accordingly,
the evidence supports the Voter Diversity Hypothesis
(H1), that shifts in party system dispersion systemati-
cally vary in the same direction as shifts in voter dis-
persion. This finding, which is labeled the Voter
Distribution Effects Result, is illustrated in Figure 3,
which plots shifts in the standard deviation of voter
self-placements (i.e., voter dispersion) along the
x-axis, and shifts in the weighted version of the party
system dispersion variable along the y-axis. The
pattern that emerges from the 62 dots is that when
grouping together the 12 Western European democra-
cies included in the empirical analyses, changes in the
diversity of voters’ policy preferences are associated
with similar shifts in the diversity of policy programs
on offer by the political parties.
Returning to Table 1, the parameter estimates for
the change in voter dispersion*electoral system propor-
tionality variable are positive and reach statistical sig-
nificance, for both the weighted and unweighted
measures of party system dispersion. These estimates
support the Electoral Laws Hypothesis (H2), that party
system dispersion is more responsive to voter disper-
sion in countries that feature less proportional electoral
systems. This finding is labeled the Electoral Laws
Result.
It should be clarified that the Electoral Laws Result
does not imply that the parties in proportional systems
are completely unresponsive to shifts in the diversity of
their voters’ policy opinions. Instead the implication of
the finding is that distributional responsiveness is gen-
erally present across political systems, but that these
effects are stronger in disproportional systems. This
point is illustrated in Figure 4, which plots shifts in
voter dispersion against shifts in (weighted) party
system dispersion, for countries with highly dispropor-
tional voting systems (Figure 4a) and for countries
with more proportional systems (Figure 4b). The dis-
proportional systems include France, Britain, Greece,
and Spain, and the proportional systems include
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, and Portugal.13 Note that in
10Braumoeller (2004) has demonstrated that properly estimating
the effects of interaction terms necessarily involves including in
the model specification each of the constitutive terms (in this case,
these terms are electoral system disproportionality and change in
voter dispersion).
11The independent variables have been centered in order to
improve the substantive interpretation of the results from the
interaction model (on centering, see Brambor, Clark, and Golder
2006 and Kam and Franzese 2005).
12The electoral system disproportionality variable does not vary
within countries, which makes running a fixed-effects model for
the original specification problematic, as this term naturally drops
out of the model specification. Nevertheless, theoretical consider-
ations relating to party system contraction (discussed in footnote
15) led to the estimation of country-specific intercepts, and the
results from these analyses supported the substantive conclusions
that are reported below.
13The countries are divided into “disproportional” and “propor-
tional” categories based on the disproportionality scores reported
in Appendix A in Lijphart (1999) where a (relatively sizeable)
4-point gap divides the two groupings.
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both figures the slope of the estimated regression line is
positive, indicating that—for both more and less pro-
portional systems—increases in voter dispersion are
associated with increases in party dispersion. However
the regression line slope is much steeper for dispropor-
tional systems (B = 1.66) than for proportional systems
(B = .56).Thus the interpretation of the model suggests
that the Voter Distribution Effects Result applies to the
12 industrialized democracies included in the empiri-
cal analyses. However, the Electoral Laws Result implies
that party system responsiveness, defined in terms of
how the diversity of parties’ policy offerings varies with
the dispersion of citizens’ policy preferences, is stron-
ger in systems that feature less proportional electoral
laws.14
14Note that the empirical support reported for the Electoral Laws
Hypothesis is also consistent with previous empirical research.
Paul Pennings (2005) conducts a similar analysis for the Nether-
lands during approximately the same time period, 1971–2002. In
the (proportional) Dutch system, Pennings observes “partisan
rigidity” and that “parties seem to stick to their ideological profile
and do not make extreme shifts in their policy priorities, as voters
seem to do from time to time” (2005, 36–37). This implies that
parties in proportional systems such as the Netherlands place an
emphasis on implementing their preferred policy preferences
and/or on maintaining a stable, unwavering policy image.
TABLE 1 Multivariate Analyses of Interelection Party System Dispersion Shifts
Unweighted Party
System Dispersion
Weighted Party System
Dispersion
Unweighted Party
System Dispersion
Weighted Party System
Dispersion
Basic Basic Advanced Advanced
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change in voter
dispersion (t)
.45*
(.26)
.89***
(.30)
.54**
(.24)
.84***
(.30)
Change in voter
dispersion (t)
*Electoral system
disproportionality
.09†
(.05)
.11*
(.06)
.12**
(.06)
.16**
(.07)
Electoral system
disproportionality
-.007
(.007)
-.01
(.008)
-.008
(.007)
-.02*
(.01)
Change in party system
dispersion (t-1)
-.41***
(.10)
-.42***
(.11)
Intercept -.03
(.04)
-.03
(.04)
-.04
(.03)
-.05
(.04)
N 62 62 50 50
Adjusted R2 .04 .13 .30 .33
Notes: *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, two-tailed test; †p = .105. Standard errors are in parentheses. The unweighted version of the
dependent variable is the change in the standard deviation of left-right policy offerings for a country between election t-1 (the previous
election) and election t (the current election), based on the left-right codings of parties’ policy programs that are reported in the CD-ROM
in Budge et al. (2001). The calculations for weighted party system dispersion are in Equation 1 in the text. The definitions of the
independent variables are given in the text as well.
In addition, note that one observation per country is sacrificed by including the lagged dependent variable, change in party system
dispersion (t-1), in the advanced specification (columns 3–4). The results of these analyses are consequently based on 50 observations
instead of 62, since there are 12 countries included in the study.
FIGURE 3 Interelection Shifts of Voter and Party
Dispersion
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Notes: The calculations for the weighted version of party system
dispersion are in Equation 1 in the text. Voter dispersion is
calculated as the standard deviation of citizens’ left-right
self-placement scores from the Eurobarometer survey of the
election-year for each country (see Table A1 in the web appendix).
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Sensitivity Analyses
Given the structure of the data, serially correlated
errors (within countries) is a possibility. That is, the
causal processes which generate the change in the
diversity of party preferences at time t, could also be
operating during the prior interelection period (t-1).
Indeed Lagrange Multiplier tests reveal the existence of
temporal correlation for the dependent variable,
change in party dispersion. To address this issue, the
parameters of a model that was identical to the basic
specification given in equation 2 has been estimated,
except that it incorporated an additional variable,
change in party system dispersion (t-1), which is the
lagged version of the dependent variable (see Beck and
Katz 1995, 1996). This model is labeled the advanced
specification. The parameter estimates for the
advanced specification, which are reported in columns
3–4 of Table 1, continue to support the Voter Distri-
bution Effects and the Electoral Laws Results.
In addition to the results reported in Table 1, the
parameters were estimated for several additional
pooled data specifications. The parameters were esti-
mated for a fixed-effects model specification that
tested for country-specific effects.15 Furthermore, the
advanced model specification was reestimated on a
country-by-country basis, omitting one country at a
time. A final model was respecified using the cross-
sectional data, where the actual value of party system
dispersion at election (t) was the dependent variable,
and voter dispersion at election (t) was the crucial
independent variable (including the lagged dependent
variable as one of the independent variables).16 The
parameter estimates for each of the model specifica-
tions described above support identical substantive
conclusions to the ones reported in this study.17
15The fixed-effects model controls directly for the possibility of
party system contraction, a pattern implied by the finding
reported in Adams et al. (2004), that political parties are more
responsive to public opinion shifts that move voters away from the
party’s position (as occurs for left-wing parties, for instance, when
public opinion shifts to the right), than they are to public opinion
shifts in the party’s direction. This finding implies that party
systems should contract over time. The author would like to thank
an anonymous referee for raising this point.
16The reason for estimating the parameters of this model is that the
dependent variable is constructed as the difference in party system
dispersion between election (t-1) and election (t). By specifying
the dependent variable in this way, it is assumed that in a model
which estimates the actual value of the dependent variable, that the
coefficient estimating the effects of the lagged dependent variable
will be equal to one (Markus 1979).
17The results from these analyses are presented in Tables A2–A4 in
the web appendix.
FIGURES 4a and 4b Interelection Shifts of Voter
and Party Dispersion for
Disproportional (4a) and
Proportional Systems (4b)
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Notes: France, Great Britain, Greece, and Spain are classified as
disproportional systems, while Belgium, Denmark, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal are
classified as proportional systems. The calculations for weighted
party system dispersion are in the first equation in the text. Voter
dispersion is measured by calculating the standard deviation of
voter left-right self-placements from the Eurobarometer survey of
the election-year for each country. Also, note that Britain and
Greece are the most distributionally responsive political systems,
while the Netherlands, Germany, and Luxembourg—three of the
most proportional systems in the data set—are the least
distributionally responsive systems.
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Conclusion
A shift in the universality of franchise, a weakening of
traditional views by some cataclysmic event like World
War II, a social revolution like that following upon
industrialization—any such disturbing occurrence may
move the modes on the political scale. A change in the
number of voters per se is irrelevant; it is the distribution
which counts. (Downs 1957, 130–31)
According to Downs, knowing the distribution of
voters is crucial for understanding the landscape of
political competition. Yet there has been very little, if
any, systematic cross-national empirical examination
of voter distribution effects. This study hurdles some
of the macrolevel observational barriers that are
required to analyze theories at the party system level.
In so doing, two related results emerge. The first is the
Voter Distribution Effects Result, that the diversity of
policies on offer by political parties tends to be
responsive to the diversity of the electorate’s policy
preferences. The specific relevance of this finding is
that it lends empirical observation to formal theory
that seeks to explain the net incentives, i.e., centrifugal
versus centripetal incentives, for party positioning
across political systems. Indeed, the diversity of the
electorate’s left-right policy preferences systematically
influences the diversity of parties’ policy positioning.
This empirical finding is consistent with the theoreti-
cal results reported by Cox (1990) and Merrill and
Adams (2002).
The broader significance of the Voter Distribution
Effects Result is that it neatly complements traditional
macrolevel empirical analyses of policy representation
(see, e.g., Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995),
which emphasize responsiveness to the center of
public opinion, by also considering the responsiveness
of a party system as a whole to the distribution of
voters’ policy preferences.
The second major finding is the Electoral Laws
Result, which states that political systems featuring less
proportional electoral rules are more distributionally
responsive than are more proportional electoral
systems. This finding supports some of the arguments
that were cited in the second section above (see Laver
and Shepsle 1996; Schofield et al. 1998), suggesting
that policy moderation and policy rigidity is perhaps
more common in PR systems than originally thought.
Conversely, the Electoral Laws Result also implies that
parties are extremely sensitive to shifts in their sup-
porters’ positions under disproportional electoral laws
and that this motivation could be due in part to the
structural incentives which induce parties to empha-
size vote maximization more so than in proportional
systems.
The findings raise several interesting questions for
future research. While the evidence suggests that there
are indeed direct linkages between the diversity of
voter preferences and the diversity of policy positions
that are on offer by parties in a political system, the
explanations that have been offered are only tentative.
A comprehensive explanation requires contextual
analyses of Western European parties: namely, of
parties’ organizational structures, party elites, as well
as of rank-and-file party supporters. An analysis of
these factors, though outside the scope of this study, is
necessary in order to reach a better understanding of
how changes occur to the diversity of policy choices
that political parties present to the electorate.
Nonetheless, these findings are relevant to our
understanding of the democratic process and, specifi-
cally, to the dynamics between voter and party ideolo-
gies across institutional settings. Moreover, the study is
perhaps refreshing for normative visions of democ-
racy, insofar as it implies that party systems do not act
solely as a policy conduit for the median voter.
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